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TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE BY THE
GOVERNMENT
Christopher Slobogin"
Many important aspects of our lives are inscribed in writ-
ten and digitized records, housed in private businesses, gov-
ernment agencies and other institutions. These records include
all sorts of information about us: reports on our medical status
and financial condition; data about our purchases, rentals,
real estate holdings, licenses, and memberships; logs listing
the destination of our emails and our Internet wanderings;
and countless other bits of individual descriptors, ranging
from salary levels to college grades to driver's license num-
bers. Whether the information memorializes our own version
of personal activities or is created by the record-holder itself,
there is often an explicit or implicit understanding that the
information will be used or viewed by a limited number of
people for circumscribed purposes. In other words, we consider
the contents of many of these records private, vis-a-vis most of
the world.
Thus, it may be surprising that law enforcement officials
can, perfectly legally, gain access to all of this information
much more easily than they can search our houses or even our
cars. While the latter types of actions require probable cause,
government can obtain many of the records just described
simply by asking (or paying) for them.' And, at most, all the
. Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G.
Levin College of Law. For their comments on this paper, I would like to thank
Jerold Israel, Scott Sundby, Peter Swire, George Thomas, and participants in
workshops or symposia at the following schools: Mississippi, DePaul, Florida
State, Ohio State, and Hastings.
' See generally Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Pri-
vacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002).
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government needs to show in order get any of these records is
that they are "relevant" to a government investigation-a much
lower, and much more diffuse, level of justification than proba-
ble cause.2
This state of affairs might make sense when the records
sought are truly public in nature. It might also be justifiable
when the records involve an entity such as a corporation,
professional service provider, or government department and
are sought in an effort to investigate the entity and its mem-
bers. But today, facilitated by the computerization of informa-
tion and communication, government routinely obtains person-
al medical, financial and email records, in connection with
investigations that have nothing to do with business or gov-
ernmental corruption.3  That practice is much more
questionable.
This article explores the scope and regulation of what I
will call "transaction surveillance" by the government. That
term is meant to distinguish the subject of this article from
both "physical surveillance" and "communications surveil-
lance." Physical surveillance is real-time observation of physi-
cal activities, using either the naked eye or enhancement
devices such as binoculars or video cameras. Communications
surveillance is real-time interception of the content of commu-
nications, relying on wiretapping, bugging, hacking, and vari-
ous other methods of intercepting oral statements and wire
and electronic transmissions. Transaction surveillance, in
contrast, involves accessing already-existing records, either
physically or through computer databanks. It also encompass-
es accessing, in real-time or otherwise, the identifying signals
of a transaction (such as the address of an email recipient).4
Like physical and communications surveillance, transac-
2 See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
See Solove, supra note 1.
This tripartite division of surveillance was developed by the American Bar
Association's Task Force on Law Enforcement and Technology and is explicated
further in Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
383, 387-88 (1997).
[Vol. 75
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tion surveillance is a potent way of discovering and making
inferences about a person's activities, character and identity.
Yet, despite a bewildering array of statutorily created authori-
zation requirements, transaction surveillance by the govern-
ment is subject to far less regulation than either physical
surveillance of activities inside the home or communications
surveillance.5 My principal argument is that transaction sur-
veillance should be subject to much more legal monitoring
than it is.
To get to that conclusion, this article proceeds in four
parts. Part I explains why government, and in particular law
enforcement, finds transaction surveillance so attractive, and
why it is so easy to carry out in this digital age. Part II de-
scribes the current law regulating transaction surveillance.
Not only is this regulation minimal, it is confusing and contra-
dictory; beyond the traditional subpoena, challengeable by the
target of the investigation, current law recognizes a number of
subpoena mutations that seem to have little rhyme or reason.
If it contributes nothing else, this article should at least clari-
fy the nature of today's regulatory framework.
Part III criticizes this framework and outlines a more
promising approach. The proposed reform recognizes, as does
the current regime, that different sorts of records merit differ-
ent levels of protection. But, in contrast to current law, the
proposal would significantly increase the degree of protection
in a number of situations, to the probable cause level for per-
sonal records held by private and public entities and to the
reasonable suspicion level for personal records readily avail-
able to the public.
Part IV concludes by examining alternatives to the pro-
As discussed infra text accompanying notes 38-82, transaction surveillance
never requires probable cause. In contrast, communications surveillance requires a
warrant,, which may be issued only if there is probable cause and other methods
of obtaining the information have failed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). Physical surveil-
lance of the home requires a warrant unless it can take place with the naked eye
from a lawful vantage point using technology that only replicates such naked eye
viewing or it involves technology that is in general public use. Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001).
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posal (and to the current regime). It rejects both an approach
that requires probable cause for all records searches and, at
the other extreme, an approach that would allow suspicionless
records searches on condition that anything discovered is
subject to strict limitations on disclosure. It also criticizes an
approach that relies on the legislature, rather than the courts
and the Fourth Amendment, to establish fundamental regula-
tory requirements. Not all recorded information warrants the
maximum refuge from government intrusion. But much of it
deserves much more protection than it receives today.
I. THE CURRENT REACH OF TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE
Transaction surveillance comes in many forms. This arti-
cle divides it into two types: target-based and event-based.
Using these categorizations, the following discussion relies on
hypotheticals to flesh out the various ways transaction sur-
veillance can assist law enforcement in investigating street
crime.
A. Target-Based Transaction Surveillance
Assume that I'm a federal agent, and that I'm suspicious
of you for some vague reason-perhaps you often pay for your
airplane tickets with cash,6 or you have been observed with
accessories you shouldn't be able to afford,7 or you are a
young, Arab male who goes to the local mosque on a daily
basis.' Under these types of circumstances, I clearly do not
have sufficient suspicion for an arrest.9 On the other hand, I
6 Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 (1983) (noting that paying for
an airline ticket with cash is often an element of drug courier profiles used by
the Drug Enforcement Administration).
Cf State v. Cookson, 361 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Mo. 1962) (informant, who al-
leged that defendants had robbed a tavern, reported that "they had a large sum
of money and were spending freely").
" Cf. Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United
States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2865 (2001) (recount-
ing FBI surveillance of a Brooklyn mosque).
' An arrest or prolonged questioning in the stationhouse requires probable
cause. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
[Vol. 75
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feel I would be neglecting my obligation as a law enforcement
official if I did not investigate you a bit further. So how do I
find out more about you?
I could confront you directly, either on the street or
through a grand jury. ° But neither approach is likely to net
much information, and both will tip you off that I'm checking
you out. Ditto with respect to going to your acquaintances and
neighbors; they will probably not be complely forthcoming and
they might let you know I've been nosing around. I could try
the undercover agent approach-there might be rich payoffs if I
or one of my informants can weasel into your good graces. But
success at that endeavor is rare, and spending so much effort
on someone about whom I'm merely suspicious would usually
be a waste of time. I could also surreptitiously follow you
around for awhile, but that tactic is unlikely to produce much,
especially if you make most of your contacts through techno-
logical means-phones, email-rather than physical travel. Of
course, I could tap your phone and intercept your emails, but
that requires a warrant based on probable cause, which I do
not have.
Thankfully there are other, much more efficient ways I
can covertly acquire information about you, many of which I
can carry out without leaving my desk and most of which, as
the next section describes, require no or little legal authoriza-
tion. The easiest way to get useful data is to contact one of the
many companies, usually called commercial data brokers
(CDBs), that use computers and the Internet to dig up "dirt"
from public and not-so public records." One such company is
LexisNexis, the legal research bohemoth, which operates
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 72-76 (4th ed. 2000).
" Note further that even questioning in the field that lasts longer than a few
minutes requires reasonable suspicion, which exists only if there are specific and
articulable facts that the person is or has been engaging in criminal activity. Id.
" In fact, the website for one of these companies can be found at
"digdirt.com". The services are of uneven quality. See Preston Gralia, Digital
Gumshoes, available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,20148,00.asp (Nov. 13,
2001) (recounting efforts to use various services, including digdirt, with mixed
results). For present purposes, however, the point is that their potential for trans-
action surveillance is enormous.
2005]
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Accurint, a program that allows "organizations to quickly and
easily extract valuable knowledge from .. tens of billions of
data records on individuals and businesses," armed with no
more than a name, address, phone number, or social security
number. 2 Through this process, I can obtain information
about a wide array of your transactions, including: bankrupt-
cies and corporate filings, criminal convictions and criminal
and civil court data (including marriage and divorce informa-
tion), driver's licenses and motor vehicle information, firearms,
hunting, fishing and professional licenses and permits,
Internet domain names, property deeds and assessments, and
voter registration information. 3 For some states, the infor-
mation held in "public records" by government bureaucracies
and available via computer is immensely broader: some types
of medical records, Social Security numbers, crime victim's
names, credit card and account numbers, psychiatric evalu-
ation reports, tax returns, payroll information, and family
profiles."' For a time, all of this was made even more easily
accessible to state law enforcement officials through MATRIX
(Multi-State Anti-Terrorist Information Exchange), a multi-
state consortium that allowed police to use Accurint for inves-
tigative purposes until its federal funding was discontinued in
2005.'s
The FBI and other federal agencies rely on equally power-
ful commercial data brokers, with perhaps the most popular
being Choicepoint. 6 Under its contract with the federal gov-
12 See Accurint Website, available at www.accurint.coniaoutus.html (last ac-
cessed on Sept. 13, 2005). LexisNexis bought Accurint from SeisInt in 2005.
13 Id.
"' Robert Ellis Smith, Here's Why People Are Mad, 29 PRIVACY J. 7, 7 (Jan.
2003) (citing Stephen Grimes, administrator of the Judicial Records Center in
Rhode Island), available at httpJ/www.privacyjournal.net/.
"5 See Fla. Dep't Law Enforcement, MATRIX Pilot Project Concludes (April 14,
2005), available at http:/www.fdle.state.fl.us.press-releases/20050415 matrix-
project (noting, however, that Florida and several other states may continue fund-
ing the program).
16 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforce-
ment, 29 N.C. J. INT'L & COMM. REG. 595, 617-18 (describing the FBI's "secret,
classified contract" with Choicepoint).
[Vol. 75144
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ernment, Choicepoint can provide me, as a federal agent, with
"credit headers" (information at the top of a credit report
which includes name, address, previous address, phone num-
ber, social security number and employer); pre-employment
screening information (including financial reports, education
verification, reference verification, felony check, motor vehicle
record and professional credential verification); "asset location
services"; information about neighbors and family members;
licenses (driver's, pilot's and professional); business informa-
tion compiled by state bureaucracies; and "derogatory informa-
tion" such as arrests, liens, judgments and bankruptcies." If
you think I wouldn't bother requesting such a check, think
again; between 1999 and 2001, Choicepoint and similar servic-
es ran between 14,000 and 40,000 searches per month for the
United States Marshall's Service alone. 18
The one drawback to the type of information I get from
CDBs is that it is pretty general. I may want to know more
about what you do on a daily basis. Fortunately, there are a
number of services that can help me out. For instance, ad-
vances in data warehousing and data exchange technology in
the financial sector allow very easy access to a virtual cornu-
copia of transaction-related information that can reveal,
among other things, "what products or services you buy; what
charities, political causes, or religious organizations you con-
tribute to; . . . where, with whom, and when you travel; how
you spend your leisure time; ... whether you have unusual
or dangerous hobbies; and even whether you participate in
certain felonious activities." 9 If I jump through some pro for-
" Id. at 601-02. Note also that once a social security number and other iden-
tifying information is obtained, other personal information might become much
more easily accessible. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and
the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEx. L. REV. 89, 108-14 (2001) (pointing out that
schools, financial institutions and other entities make personal information acces-
sible by anyone with the right Social Security number, address, and mother's
maiden name).
" Id. at 4-6. In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducted
approximately 23,000 such searches a month. Id. at 11.
" Janet Dean Gertz, The Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Finan-
cial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943, 944-45, 951 (2002).
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ma legal hoops (detailed in Part II), I can also get records of
all the phone numbers you dial and receive calls from,2 ° and
from your Internet Service Provider (ISP) I can get every
website address you have visited (so-called "clickstream data")
and every email address you have contacted.2'
The latter information can be particularly revealing to the
extent you transact your business over the Internet. Recently
some ISPs, like America OnLine, have stopped maintaining
clickstream data, precisely so they won't have to answer such
law enforcement requests. No worries. All I have to do is
invest in something called "snoopware." Bearing names like
BackOrifice, Spyagent, and WinWhatWhere,23 snoopware is
to be distinguished from adware and spyware. The latter soft-
ware tells the buyer of the program how to contact people who
visit the buyer's website. Snoopware, in contrast, allows its
buyer to track the target well beyond a single website; it accu-
mulates the addresses of all the Internet locations the target
visits, as well as the recipients of the target's emails. The FBI
has developed a similar program, once dubbed Carnivore, now
called DCS-1000, that filters all emails that pass through a
particular server.24 Although some transaction snoopware
2 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 allows prose-
cutors to obtain this information by certifying to a court that it is "relevant" to
an ongoing investigation. See infra text accompanying notes 43-47.
21 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act at most requires a showing of
relevance for this information. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121; infra notes 69-77 and ac-
companying text; see also Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. J. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 68-69
(2000) (detailing the type of information government can obtain through
clickstream data).
2 Conversation with Peter Swire, Professor, Ohio State School of Law, Sep-
tember 20, 2004. The Electronic Frontier Foundations has recommended that ISPs
only keep personally identifiable communications logs for "so long as it is opera-
tionally necessary, and in no event for more than a few weeks." Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation, Best Data Practices for Online Service Providers, from the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation at http://www.eff.orgtosp/20040819_-OSPBestPractices.
pdf2 (June 29, 2005).
3 See Cade Metz, Spyware: It's Lurking on Your Machine, PC MAG., Apr. 22,
2003, at 85, 88.
24 Jeremy C. Smith, The USA PATRIOT Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing National Secu-
[Vol. 75
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requires access to the server or computer to install, other
types, called Trojan Horses, can electronically worm their way
onto the system disguised as something useful.25
In short, even if you stay at home and conduct all your
business and social life via phone, email and surfing the 'Net,
I can construct what one commentator has called "a complete
mosaic" of your characteristics. 26 And I can do all of this
without you having a clue I'm doing it. It is also possible that
I could surreptitiously obtain an even wider array of transac-
tional information-on matters ranging from medical treatment
to financial decisions-with very little effort. But further dis-
cussion of that possibility, as well as of the huge amount of
transactional information that government can obtain if it is
willing to proceed overtly, will have to await Part II's explana-
tion of the current legal regime.
B. Event-Based Transaction Surveillance
Now consider an entirely different type of scenario, one in
which government has no suspicion of or even interest in a
specific individual, but rather possesses information about a
particular crime that has been or will be committed. Govern-
ment efforts to obtain transactional data in this situation is
not target-based, but event-based. Say, for instance, that the
police know that a sniper-killer wears a particular type of
shoe (thanks to mudprints near a sniper site), that he owns a
rity, 82 N.C. L. REV. 412, 448-49 (2003). Recently, the FBI announced that it
would no longer use DCS-1000, but instead rely on "unspecified commercial soft-
ware to eavesdrop on computer traffic." FBI Cuts Carnivore Internet Probe, at
http://www.cnn.com/2005fTECHlinternet/01]8lfbi.carnivore.ap/index.html (on file
with the Mississippi Law Journal).
25 Metz, supra note 23, at 85. Some snoopware, using "key logger" technology,
can even tell the user the content of one's computer screen. Id. DCS-1000 can
also be programmed to access content as well as identifying information. Joseph
F. Kampherstein, Internet Privacy Legislation and the Carnivore System, 19 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 155, 167 (2001). Both functions are forms of communica-
tions surveillance that are beyond the scope of this article.
2 Anthony Paul Miller, Teleinformatics, Transborder Data Flows and the
Emerging Struggle for Information: An Introduction to the Arrival of the New
Information Age, 20 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 89, 111 (1986).
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particular type of sweater (because of threads found at anoth-
er site), and that he reads Elmore Leonard novels (because of
allusions to those books made in his communications to the
police). Law enforcement understandably might want to pe-
ruse the purchase records of local shoe, clothing, and book
stores as part of their investigation. Once police obtain the
credit card numbers of those who bought, say, the type of
sweater found at the murder scene, they can trace other pur-
chases made with the same card, to see if the relevant type of
shoe or book was bought by any of the same people. Of course,
if there is a match on two or three of the items, the surveil-
lance may then turn into a target-based investigation.
Or say that a CIA informant reports that he believes Al
Qaeda is considering blowing up a major shopping mall, using
skydivers jumping from rental planes.2" The FBI might want
to requisition the records of all companies near major metro-
politan areas that teach ski-diving and that rent airplanes, as
well as the "cookie" logs (records of cyberspace visitors) of all
websites that provide information about manufacturing ex-
plosives, to see if there are any intersections between these
three categories of data, in particular involving men with
Arab-sounding names. If there are then, again, further target-
based surveillance investigation might take place.
Although the first type of event-based surveillance is
backward-looking and the second is forward-looking, both law
enforcement efforts are a form of what has been called "data
mining" or "profiling," that is, an attempt to look through
transaction information to find patterns of behavior that per-
mit police to zero in on possible suspects.2" If the information
sought is not digitized, which is likely with respect to records
kept by ski-diving companies, for instance, then law enforce-
27 This imaginary scenario is borrowed from the second Markle Report. Markle
Foundation, Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security: Second Report of
the Markle Foundation Task Force, app. D at 121-33 (2003), available at http:fl
www.markletaskforce.org.
28 For a general description of data mining and its prevalence, see Andrew J.
McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 71-88 (2003).
[Vol. 75
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ment may have to rely on good old-fashioned human snooping.
In this day and age, however, a significant amount of data
mining can be carried out using technology. For example, the
Defense Department's Total Information Awareness program,
before it was severely limited by Congress, would have used
software developed by private companies "to sift through vir-
tual mountains of data of everyday transactions, such as cred-
it card purchases, e-mail and travel itineraries, in an attempt
to discover patterns predictive of terrorist activity."29 Wheth-
er it relies on computers or humans, event-based data mining,
like transaction surveillance of particular individuals, can
easily be conducted unbeknownst to those whose records are
surveilled.
C. Summary
Technology has made transaction surveillance a particu-
larly powerful law enforcement tool. Given the potential that
transaction surveillance provides the government for creating
personality mosaics and linking people to crime, it could well
be even more useful than visual tracking of person's activities
(physical surveillance) and eavesdropping on or hacking into a
person's communications (communications surveillance). But
the real beauty of transaction surveillance for the government
is that, compared to physical surveillance of activities inside
the home and communications surveillance, it is so lightly
regulated. As Part II explains, under today's regulatory re-
gime it is much easier for government to obtain information
about our most intimate transactions, including medical and
financial matters, than it is to intercept our communications
about those transactions.
II. CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF TRANSACTION
SURVEILLANCE
Under the Fourth Amendment, the government usually
cannot conduct a search of houses, persons, papers and effects
20 Id. at 64; see also infra note 122.
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without probable cause," a relatively high level of certainty
akin to a more-likely-than-not standard (which, in non-exigent
situations, must be found by a magistrate pursuant to an
application for a warrant).3 For some less invasive actions (a
frisk, for instance), police only need reasonable suspicion,
which is a lower level of certainty than probable cause but
still requires "specific and articulable facts" that "criminal
activity may be afoot," to quote from the famous case of Terry
v. Ohio.3" Finally, in some "special needs" situations (search-
es of school children or employees; drug testing; health and
safety inspections; roadblocks), the police need only act "rea-
sonably," but that test still usually requires reasonable suspi-
cion," or at least a showing that those conducting the gov-
ernment action are pursuing some end other than criminal
law enforcement.34
In contrast, transaction surveillance, whether it is event-
based or target-based, never requires probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion, even when conducted by government agents
whose primary goal is criminal investigation. At most, govern-
ment agents seeking transactional information need a subpoe-
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3' See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 9, at 137-42.
32 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968).
" See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) ("The delay in correcting
the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than rea-
sonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to
the agency's work, and ultimately to the public interest."); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341-42, 344 (1985) (holding that "a search of a student by a teach-
er or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reason-
able grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence" and finding
that this standard was met in this case because there was reasonable suspicion).
' See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (upholding warrantless,
suspicionless school drug testing, noting that "in the context of safety and admin-
istrative regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable
when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant and probable-cause requirement impracticable); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) ("We have never approved a checkpoint program
whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
Rather, our checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the gener-
al rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized
suspicion.").
[Vol. 75
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na-either a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury, or
an "administrative subpoena" issued by a government agen-
cy-which is valid as long as the information it seeks is "rel-
evant" to a legitimate (statutorily-authorized) investigation.
Relevance, as defined by the Supreme Court, is an extremely
low standard. In the grand jury context, a subpoena may be
quashed on irrelevancy grounds only when the court "deter-
mines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category
of materials the Government seeks will produce information
relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investiga-
tion."35 The relevancy standard in the administrative subpoe-
na context is even lower, with the Supreme Court holding that
"[elven if one were to regard the [subpoena] as caused by
nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforc-
ing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that
corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public
interest."36 In short, the link between the information a sub-
poena commands and the investigation the government is
pursuing can be very tenuous indeed. Although a subpoena
may be challenged before it is executed, a successful challenge
is exceedingly rare, whether the subpoena is issued by a grand
jury or an administrative agency."
Furthermore, as we shall see, the law does not require
even a traditional subpoena for most types of transaction
surveillance. Instead, the government, in particular Congress,
" United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (emphasis add-
ed).
. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); see also United
States v. Powell, 397 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) (holding that administrative subpoenas
are valid if the records sought are "relevant" to an investigation conducted for a
"legitimate purpose"); United States v. Hunton & Williams, 952 F. Supp. 843, 854
(D.D.C. 1997) (holding that the Powell inquiry is more deferential than the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard of review for agency action under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act).
" See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, 3 CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 134 (2d ed. 1999) ("Courts generally give grand juries considerable
leeway in judging relevancy."); JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J.
MEZINES, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20-59 (2002) ("[Slubpoenas will be enforced as to
any documents that 'are not plainly immaterial or irrelevant to the investiga-
tion.-).
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has either invented new forms of authorization that are even
easier to obtain or has simply permitted unrestrained law
enforcement access to transactional information. The following
account of this incredibly weak regulatory regime starts with
the law regarding transaction surveillance of identifying infor-
mation, conducted in real-time, then describes regulation of
government attempts to obtain public records, and finally
describes transaction surveillance of records held by private
entities.
A. Interception of Transaction Information
Real-time government interception of the content of com-
munications (what I am calling communications surveillance)
is prohibited unless authorized by a warrant based on
probable cause.38 In contrast, interception of the identifying
features of the communication-the names of the communica-
tors, their phone numbers or email addresses, and the ad-
dresses of websites visited-can take place on a much lesser
showing. The Fourth Amendment does not apply at all to this
type of transaction surveillance, and statutory law places
virtually no restrictions on it.
The Fourth Amendment's justification require-
ments-probable cause and the like-only apply if government
engages in a "search or seizure." Although one might reason-
ably label government efforts to track down a person's phone
and email correspondents a search, the Supreme Court has
held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs only when a
government action infringes a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.39 More importantly for present purposes, the Court has
determined, in Smith v. Maryland,° that we do not have a
38 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). The court must also find that "normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Id. § 2518(3Xc).
"9 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) ("[A] Fourth Amendment
search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable.") (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
4 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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reasonable expectation in the phone numbers we dial because
we know or should know that phone companies keep a record
of these numbers, and thus "assume the risk" that the phone
company will decide to disclose this information to the govern-
ment.41 Because it is generally known that Internet service
providers monitor, if only temporarily, our emails and Internet
surfing, the Court would probably also say that we assume the
risk these providers will become government informants. Al-
though Universal Resource Locators (URLs) can be more infor-
mative than a mere phone number, both because they are
addresses (e.g., www.amazon.com/kidneydisease) and because
they allow access to the website and thus permit government
to ascertain what the user has viewed, the lower courts apply-
ing Smith appear to see no difference between the two types of
routing information.42 Accordingly, the government can prob-
ably ignore the Fourth Amendment when intercepting phone
numbers and Internet addresses.
" Id. at 744 ("[Pletitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordi-
nary course of business . . [thereby] assum[ing] the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.")
4 Cf. Thygeson v. U.S. Bancroft, No. CU-03-467-ST 2004 WL 2066746 (D. Or.
Sept. 15, 2004) ("[Wihen the information defendants collected was only the
website addresses, rather than the actual content of the websites Thygeson visit-
ed, [the surveillance] is analogous to a pen registry search, where in the Fourth
Amendment context, courts have held that defendants have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial because the numbers are con-
veyed to the telephone company."); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d
1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) ("When defendant entered into an agreement with
Road Runner for Internet service, he knowingly revealed all information connected
to the IP address .... "); see also infra note 46. Billing records of ISPs may also
be unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Hambrick, 225 F.3d
656 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (holding that person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy "in the account information given to the ISP in
order to establish the e-mail account, [because it] is non-content information"
disclosure of which "to a third party destroys the privacy expectation that might
have existed previously"), available at 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *12. In-
deed, some courts have held that the content of email messages, once they are
opened, deserve no Fourth Amendment protection because one assumes the risk
the recipient will reveal it to others. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp.
1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa.
1996); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417-18 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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Congress has imposed some statutory restraints on this
type of surveillance, but nothing approaching the usual Fourth
Amendment protections. In the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), it created a new, streamlined
type of authorization process for use of pen registers (tech-
nology which intercepts outgoing phone numbers) and trap
and trace devices (technology which intercepts incoming num-
bers), a process that can be initiated by either a federal gov-
ernment attorney or a state law enforcement officer. All the
government agent must do is certify to a court facts that show
the information is "relevant to an ongoing investigation" and
is "likely to be obtained by [the surveillance].""3 If that certif-
ication is made, the court must issue the order.4
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the definition of
pen registers and trap and trace devices to include all devices
that obtain "dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling informa-
tion utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or elec-
tronic communications ... "' Thus, to use snoopware, DCS-
1000, and other means of ascertaining a person's email corre-
spondents and favorite websites, the government need only
certify the relevance of this information to a current investiga-
tion." Again, if this certification is made, the court must is-
sue an order.
Those of us who teach Fourth Amendment law sometimes
'3 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2000).
" United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) (the "judicial
role in approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature").
-6 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2000).
'" Most courts have held that companies that acquire "clickstream data" about
where an Internet user goes on the Internet do not violate ECPA because the
websites visited by the user have authorized the companies to access this infor-
mation. See In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1163 (W.D. Wash.
2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. COO-2746 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16947, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001). Thus, government could also obtain rout-
ing information from these private companies, without using snoopware. However,
some courts might consider that approach to be accessing "stored" information.
See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2003). If so,
government may have to obtain a subpoena. See infra text accompanying notes
65-68.
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joke about supposedly "neutral and detached" magistrates
rubberstamping warrant applications, but we also assume
that judicial independence is theoretically possible." Here, in
contrast, Congress has legislatively invented mandatory
rubberstamping. It is tempting to call this type of authoriza-
tion a "rubberstamp order," but I will instead use the more
measured term certification order. Whatever one calls the
authorization process, it amounts to minimal limitation on
interception of transaction information.
B. Access to Publicly-held Records
Most transaction surveillance does not involve real-time
interception of information, but rather contemplates accessing
already-existing records, held either by public or private insti-
tutions. Information in public records is particularly easy to
secure. Under current law, law enforcement officials do not
need even a certification order to use MATRIX, Choicepoint
and similar vehicles for perusing public records. In fact, law
enforcement officials need consult no other entity (certainly
not a court, and not even a prosecutor) before obtaining such
information.
Again, the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures might appear to apply here, because
looking for and through records is a search in the usual mean-
ing of the word. But, as already noted, the Supreme Court has
made clear that one cannot reasonably expect privacy in con-
nection with information voluntarily given to third parties.
Even more important than Smith in this regard is United
States v. Miller," decided three year earlier. There the Court
held that once a person surrenders information to an agency
or institution, he or she assumes the risk the third party will
" See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL SUTTON & CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES 47-48
(1985) (describing study of warrant process indicating varying degrees of judicial
rubberstamping across jurisdictions).
4' 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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hand it over to the government.49 The key declaration in
Miller is worth quoting in full: "[T]he Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed."°
The Privacy Act, enacted by Congress in 1974, does bar or
limit access to public records when they are sought by private
individuals, and even when most government officials want
them.5 But when law enforcement officials are after the re-
cords, the Act merely requires a letter from the head of the
agency that is seeking the information, detailing the law en-
forcement reasons a particular person's records are needed. 2
No court is involved, and neither individualized suspicion or
even a relevance showing is required, just the sayso of the law
enforcement department. I will call this kind of authorization
an extrajudicial certification.
Not even this level of authorization is necessary for gov-
ernment access to most public records, however. The Privacy
Act only applies to federal documents. Unless there is similar
legislation at the state level, law enforcement access to state
public records is unrestricted. 3 Furthermore, the federal gov-
4' Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
60 Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
61 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000) ("No agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records . .. unless [listing 12 exceptions].").
"2 Id. § 552a(bX7) (permitting disclosure "to another agency or to an instru-
mentality of any governmental jurisdiction within or under the control of the
United States for a civil or criminal law enforcement activity if the activity is au-
thorized by law, and if the head of the agency or instrumentality has made a
written request to the agency which maintains the record specifying the particular
portion desired and the law enforcement activity for which the record is sought").
" See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 605 (1995)
(most states lack "omnibus data protection laws," but rather have "scattered laws
[that) provide only limited protections for personal information in the public sec-
tor."). One reason Florida is an attractive place to base an operation like MA-
TRIX is that its public records law is quite extensive. See FLA. STAT. § 119.01 et
seq. ("It is the policy of this state that all state, county and municipal records
[Vol. 75
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ernment takes the position that when it obtains information
from a commercial data broker like Choicepoint, the Privacy
Act does not apply at all, because the Act literally only refers
to law enforcement efforts to get records from other govern-
ment agencies and from private companies that are adminis-
tering a system of records for the government. 4 Under this
interpretation, the only obstacle to complete government ac-
cess to all the data maintained by commercial brokers is the
price of the information.5"
C. Access to Privately-held Records
Compared to the meager limitations on intercepting trans-
actional information and accessing public records, the restric-
tions on government access to the contents of records held by
nominally private entities, such as hospitals and banks, phone
companies and Internet providers, have more teeth, but the
teeth are blunt. Again, the Fourth Amendment is pretty much
irrelevant here. The notion that one assumes the risk that
third parties will be, or turn into, government informants
applies to private entities as well as public agencies. The Su-
preme Court has specifically so held with respect to phone
companies (in Smith)" and banks (in Miller).57 It has wa-
vered in its willingness to declare private entities untrustwor-
thy confidants only in the medical context, where it has stat-
ed, in dictum, that the Fourth Amendment or the due process
clause might place constitutional limitations on law enforce-
ment access.5 " Although there are also statutory constraints
shall be open for personal inspection by any person."). Recognizing this problem,
the Florida Supreme Court recently ordered a moratorium on the digitization of
Florida's public records. Jason Krause, Too Much Information? County Clerks
Tussle with Nervous State Officials Over Posting Court Records Online, A.B.A. J.,
April 2004, at 24.
'4 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).
's See Hoofnagle, supra note 16, at 623 ("[A] database of information that
originates at a CDB would not trigger the requirements of the Privacy Act [, thus
allowing CDBs] to amass huge databases that the government is legally prohib-
ited from creating.").
" Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
'7 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
' Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) ("The reasonable
20051
HeinOnline  -- 75 Miss. L.J. 157 2005-2006
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75
on government accessing of privately-held records, they are ex-
tremely weak.
Medical records receive the most protection. Even here,
however, neither probable cause or reasonable suspicion is
required. Rather, pursuant to rules promulgated under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
the government can obtain medical records from HMOs and
hospitals with a simple subpoena. A subpoena, it will be re-
called, merely requires a finding that the information sought
is relevant to a law enforcement investigation (although the
target is entitled to notice and thus has the opportunity to
challenge the subpoena on relevance or privilege grounds).,9
Given the limited scope of the Privacy Act described above,
even that obstacle is removed if, as is true in some states,
medical and similar information is maintained as a "public re-
cord" and the government receives it through a commercial
data broker.
Financial records receive similarly minimal protection. To
get detailed information from credit agencies, a regular sub-
poena is required under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.6 °
expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests
in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical
personnel without her consent."); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) ("Be-
cause we agree with the judgment of the state legislatures and the Advisory
Committee that a psychotherapist-patient privilege will serve a public good tran-
scending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth, . . . we hold that confidential communications between a li-
censed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment
are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence."); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (recognizing, in the context
of a case involving disclosure of medical information, that a "statutory or regu-
latory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures . . . in some circumstances...
arguably has its roots in the Constitution").
" 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(iiXB) (2005) (disclosure of medical records under
HIPAA is permissible without permission of their subject if information is sought
for law enforcement purposes through a grand jury subpoena). Some courts have
required a greater showing to obtain medical records. See, e.g., Doe v. Broderick,
225 F.3d 440, 450-51 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding Miller inapplicable to medical re-
cords); Haw. Psychiatric Soc., Dist. Branch of American Psychiatric Ass'n v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979); King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 432, 495
(Ga. 2000); Thurman v. State, 861 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1). Name, addresses, and places of employment can be
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However, analogous to the situation with medical records, no
law governs government requests for similar information from
database companies and other companies that have obtained
it from credit agencies." As a result, the government routine-
ly gets the financial information it wants directly from a com-
mercial data broker, without bothering with a subpoena.62
Bank records are also easily accessible. The Right to Financial
Privacy Act generally requires only a traditional subpoena to
obtain financial records from a bank. It also recognizes a sig-
nificant variation to the traditional subpoena process: notifica-
tion of the seizure may be delayed for up to 90 days if there is
concern that service of the subpoena will tip off a suspect,
result in loss of evidence, endanger witnesses or in some other
way compromise the government's investigation. 3 In these
circumstances, in contrast to the typical subpoena process, the
target of a financial investigation will not find out that the
government has the information until well after it is obtained.
I will call this type of authorization a delayed-notice subpoena.
Outside of situations covered by the Right to Financial
Privacy Act and the Internal Revenue Code, a government
agency that is authorized to use administrative subpoenas to
obtain financial and business information from third party
entities need not give any notice to the customer whose re-
cords are sought.64 This practice recognizes still another sub-
obtained simply upon a request. Id. § 1681f.
" Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1146 (2002).
6 Chris Hoofnagle has made the argument that this ability to obtain informa-
tion through a private agency circumvents the Privacy Act, which prohibits gov-
ernment from collecting such information unless there is a specific need for it.
Hoofnagle, supra note 16, at 18.
6 12 U.S.C. § 3409. Furthermore, when subpoena power is not available to
the government, it need only submit a formal written request for the information,
a process this article calls extrajudicial certification. § 3408. Indeed, apparently
banks sometimes still simply hand over information upon request. See DAVID F.
LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: Is YouR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE PUBLIC EYE? 106-
108 (1989) (describing a number of cases in which banks surrendered account
information to law enforcement officers simply upon request and describing a
survey finding that seventy-four percent of banks did not inform their customers
of their routine disclosures to law enforcement).
" ELLEN S. PODGOR & JERRY H. ISRAEL, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN A NuT-
2005]
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poena mutation, which I will call an ex parte subpoena. This
label is meant to distinguish between third party subpoenas
that allow the target to contest the demand for production and
those that don't. The term "ex parte subpoena" emphasizes
that the customer is outside the process entirely, thus remov-
ing, in most cases, the only meaningful inhibition on fishing
expedition-by-subpoena.
Transaction surveillance of communications-related infor-
mation is regulated in a similarly weak fashion. Under ECPA,
real-time interception of the content of phone and email com-
munications requires a warrant based on probable cause.65
But if email has sat on a server for longer than 180 days with-
out being opened, or the recipient of email or voicemail access-
es it and stores it on an outside server for any length of time,
then a subpoena-delayed if necessary-is all that is needed to
obtain the content of the communication." Apparently, the
rationale behind permitting easy access to unopened mail that
is stored for 180 days is that it is, in effect, abandoned.67 The
rationale for permitting access on less than probable cause to
opened email and other communications stored by a third
party is that it becomes akin to a business record."5
SHELL 269 (2004).
65 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000); 2703(b)(1XB). Further, a subpoena is only re-
quired when the information is sought from a 'remote computer service" (e.g., a
service available to the general public, like AOL). If the information is stored
with a service not available to the general public (e.g., one run by an employer),
then ECPA does not apply at all and government may obtain the stored informa-
tion (content or identifying) simply upon a request. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(aXl-3);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2000) (defining remote computing service); U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in
Criminal Investigations 89 (July 2002), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&s
manual2002.htm.
67 See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1421 (2004). This article is an extremely helpful roadmap
and analysis of ECPA which, unfortunately, I discovered only after wading
through the statute myself. Id.
6 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVES-
DROPPING § 26:9 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that Congress felt that when an e-mail
stays on a server longer than 180 days the service provider is less like a Post
Office and more like a storage facility).
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ECPA also gives the government easy access to business
records held by phone companies and Internet service provid-
ers. Under Title II of ECPA, as amended by the Patriot Act of
2001, basic subscriber information-name, address, session
times and durations, length and type of service, means and
source of payment (including credit card numbers), and the
identity of Internet users who use a pseudonym-can be ob-
tained pursuant to an ex parte subpoena, the type of autho-
rization that requires no customer notice.69 If the government
seeks additional transactional information-such as account
logs and email addresses of other individuals with whom the
account holder has corresponded-it still need not alert the
subscriber, but must allege "specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that...
the records or other information sought, are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation." "
Apparently, this latter standard, found in § 2703(d) of
ECPA, is meant to be more demanding than the relevance
standard normally required for a subpoena. Yet it is not clear
that it is much different. Although the "specific and
articulable" language sounds like it requires reasonable suspi-
cion, note that the specific and articulable facts need only
support a finding that the information is relevant and material
to an ongoing investigation. Even if the latter highlighted
word is meant to augment the former, it does not add much;
materiality, in evidence law, merely means that the evidence
be logically related to a proposition in the case.7' Further-
69 18 U.S.C. § 2703(cXl)(E) (2001) (describing information that can be ob-
tained); § 2703(c)(3) ("A governmental entity receiving records or information un-
der this subsection is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or custom-
er.").
" § 2703(c) (describing requirements for a court order to obtain "Irlecords
concerning electronic communication service or remote computing service").
" MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 at 276-78 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999) ("Materiality . . . looks to the relation between the propositions that the
evidence is offered . . . and the issues in the case. . . . A fact that is 'of
consequence' is material . ... It is enough if the item could reasonably show
that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear without that evi-
dence.").
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more, whereas Terry contemplated that reasonable suspicion
exist with respect to the targeted individual, a § 2703(d) order,
like a subpoena, allows accessing any records that might be
relevant to an investigation, not just the target's. Finally, it is
not clear that the "relevant and material" language can be
meaningfully enforced. The statute seems to say that the only
ground on which an order issued pursuant to § 2703(d) may be
challenged is burdensomeness, which eliminates a challenge
on relevance grounds. v
Post-9/11, government access to some sorts of privately-
held records is even easier when a significant purpose of the
investigation is to nab terrorists or spies. In such cases, Sec-
tion 215 of the Patriot Act authorizes the FBI to demand the
production of "any tangible things (including books, records,
papers, documents and other items)" if it follows a simple two-
step process.73 First, the Director or his or her designee must
certify to a court that the items sought are "for an investiga-
tion to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities," and that the investigation does not
focus "solely" on activities protected by the First Amend-
ment.74 Second, the court must find that the investigation
meets these conditions; if so, it "shall" issue a Section 215
order authorizing the seizure.75 In other words, a variant of
the certification order discussed in connection with use of pen
7 § 2703(d) (providing court may quash or modify order if the request is
"unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would
cause an undue burden on such provider").
13 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001).
" § 1861(a) & (b).
76 § 1861(c). This provision also indicates that the judge may modify the
government's order. Apparently, the modification power is meant to protect
against First Amendment and overbreadth concerns. But, assuming no such con-
cerns, the judge must issue the order when the tangible items sought are "for an
authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information." § 1861(b).
Cf Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DuQ. L.
REV. 663, 694-95 (2004) (arguing that the provision for judicial modification, to-
gether with the requirements that the government swear the certification is cor-
rect and that the Attorney General report to Congress on the use of Section 215,
provide more safeguards than those associated with a subpoena reviewable only
after challenge).
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registers and trap and trace devices will suffice in this situa-
tion. In an additional twist, however, not only is the target
unable to challenge such orders, but the third party record-
holder is prohibited from telling the target the order has been
issued.7" In counter-terrorist investigations, this procedure is
all that is required to obtain customer records of Internet
service providers, libraries, video stores, schools and other
private entities (including, possibly, medical providers). Fur-
ther, the records that may be obtained in this way are not just
those of suspected terrorists, but those of anyone who might
be "relevant" to the investigation.77
Finally, even a Section 215 order is not needed when the
FBI is seeking a particular subset of "tangible items" (elec-
tronic or communication records, financial records or credit
records) in connection with a national security investigation.
Rather, all it must do is issue a form of administrative sub-
poena, known as a "National Security Letter," in which a
Special Agent (in other words, a field agent) certifies that the
information sought is relevant to a national security investiga-
tion to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities." This type of authorization is akin to
the extrajudicial certification discussed in connection with law
enforcement efforts to seek public documents under the Priva-
cy Act, but with the same gag order proviso that exists with
Section 215 orders.79
The Patriot Act allowed this extrajudicial process with
respect to financial information only when it was held by
banks. However, in December, 2003, that power was expanded
by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2003, which was en-
7 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2001); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d).
" Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1331-33 (2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (wire or
electronic service providers); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(jXA) (school records); Kathryn
Martin, The USA Patriot Act's Application to Library Patrons Records, 29 J. LE-
GIS. 283 (2003) (discussing library records).
7 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5XA) (2003). Again, the record-holder is prohibited from
informing the target of the request. § 3414(a)(5XD).
"' Swire, supra 77, at 1332-33.
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acted by Congress as part of an appropriations bill, with no
vetting by the Judiciary Committee and no debate on the floor
or in the media.' The 2003 Act allows the FBI to use extra-
judicial certification to obtain statements and records from
any financial institution "whose cash transactions have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory matters,"
including banks, stockbrokers, car dealers, casinos, credit card
companies, insurance agencies, jewelers, pawn brokers, travel
agents and airlines."' All of this information is the
government's simply on its sayso.
s2
D. Summary of Transaction Surveillance Law
Transaction surveillance has spawned a wide array of new
regulatory schemes, which are usefully summarized by locat-
ing them within the standard Fourth Amendment hierarchy.
As noted earlier, the most protective type of authorization is
the warrant, based on probable cause. Although intercepting
the content of communications and physical surveillance of the
home both require a warrant,83 no type of transaction surveil-
lance requires this most demanding form of authorization. The
next type of authorization in the hierarchy, at least in theory,
is an order based on reasonable suspicion, or what could be
" Kyle O'Dowd, Congress Hands FBI "Patriot H" Snooping Power, 28 Feb.
CHAMP. 18 (2004)
31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1996).
82 The Patriot Act's National Security Letter (NSL) provision was declared
unconstitutional in Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (2004), because of the
lack of judicial review and the gag provision. However, the decision did not find
fault with either the relevance standard or the fact that letters can be issued by
a special agent. Indeed, the court stated "the standard of review for administra-
tive subpoenas similar to NSLs is so minimal that most such NSLs would likely
be upheld in court." Id. at 502. Recent proposed amendments at most are likely
to codify Doe. Eric Lichtblau, Congress Nears Deal to Renew Antiterror Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at Al, A21. In the meantime, the FBI issues roughly
30,000 NSLs a year, maintains all the records thereby obtained (even when not
linked to terrorism), and as of this writing had still not responded to a year-old
congressional request for information about their use. Barton Gellman, The FBI's
Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2005), at Al.
83 See supra note 5.
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called a Terry order, after Terry v. Ohio,' which required
this degree of justification for a stop and frisk. Again, none of
the statutory provisions I have described (or any other regula-
tory regime for that matter) mandates this type of order; I
include it both for the sake of comprehensiveness and because
it is important to the regulatory scheme I propose below. After
a Terry order comes the traditional subpoena, issued upon a
judicial finding of relevance and challengeable by the target.
This is the first type of authorization that plays a role in
transaction surveillance; subpoenas are required to access
most medical, financial and stored email records.
Below the traditional subpoena is the delayed-notice sub-
poena, which authorizes, temporarily, unobstructed access to
financial records and stored email when a traditional subpoe-
na might frustrate the investigation. Next is the ex parte
subpoena (unchallengeable by the target), which allows access
to many types of customer records held by third party entities,
including phone and ISP account records."5 The certification
(judicial rubberstamp) order follows in the hierarchy; it autho-
rizes the use of pen registers, trap and trace devices and other
forms of transaction-oriented snoopware, as well as tangible
items other than financial records thought to be relevant to
national security investigations.86 At the bottom of the autho-
rization totem pole there is the extrajudicial certification,
which permits access to public records, and to financial and
other records relevant to national security investigations.
However, even this type of authorization is not needed to
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Arguably, the "specific and articulable facts" ex parte subpoena required by
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) is more difficult to obtain than an ordinary subpoena (and
apparently Congress so believed), but for the reasons suggested above, see supra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text, it is classified here as less protective than a
regular subpoena, at least one that notifies the target.
" People who have worked at the Department of Justice state that, in prac-
tice, a certification order may be harder to obtain than a subpoena. Personal
conversations with Orin Kerr (Feb. 17, 2005) and Paul Ohm (Jan. 20, 2005). But
I rank the certification order lower in the hierarchy of protection because the
judge plays such a minimal role; at least with a subpoena the judge is permitted
to find a seizure invalid on relevance grounds, although he may rarely do so.
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access public records that come from a state with no privacy
statute or that are accumulated by a commercial data broker.
All of the authorization mechanisms described in this para-
graph are statutory inventions, and are particularly punchless
given the lack of a remedy in the unlikely event government is
found to have abused them.87
The chart below depicts the foregoing summary, consist-
ing of eight levels of authorization:
CURRENT LAW OF TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE
Auth'zation Req'd Certainty Level
" For instance, there is no exclusionary sanction under ECPA, or under the
Right to Financial Privacy Act. WHrrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 9, at 344-
45; United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1986). Nor are damages
actions a significant deterrent, given the intangible nature of the harm involved.
Cf. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that, under ECPA, "a
person must sustain actual damages to be entitled to the statutory minimum
damages award" of $1,000).
Transaction
Warrant Probable cause
Terry Order Reasonable suspicion
Medical, financial & Subpoena Relevance, challenge-
tax records; stored able by target
email
Financial records and Delayed-notice Sub- Relevance, challenge-
stored email if notifi- poena able by target only
cation poses risks after records obtained
Billing records and Ex Parte Subpoena Relevance, challenge-
logs of phone compa- able only by third
nies & ISPs; most cus- party record-holder
tomer records
Interception of Certification Order Relevance (deter-
catalogic information mined by govern-
re calls & email; tan- ment), issued by
gible items re terror- court, challengeable
ism only by third party
record-holder
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Federal public re- Extrajudicial Certifi- Relevance (deter-
cords; financial re- cation mined by govern-
cords re terrorism ment), not challenge-
able by any party(?)"
State public records None None
not protected by law
or that are acquired
by a CDB
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATION OF TRANSACTION
SURVEILLANCE
The differences between the various types of authorization
outlined above are sometimes subtle, but one thing is certain:
their number goes well beyond (and below) the traditional
three-tiered approach of probable cause, reasonable suspicion,
and special needs/reasonableness determinations, all chal-
lengeable by the target of the investigation. As a conceptual
matter, a system that recognizes more than three authoriza-
tion levels may make sense. In previous work, for instance, I
have argued for application of a proportionality principle,
which specifically requires that the certainty required for a
search be roughly proportionate to its intrusiveness, and
which suggests that the traditional probable cause/reasonable
suspicion dichotomy is insufficient as a means of implement-
ing that idea. 9 My disagreement with current law is not with
the general approach, but with the order and substance of the
hierarchy.
The degree to which transaction surveillance is regulated
should not depend on whether the information sought is inter-
cepted in real-time or is stored, or on whether it may be relat-
ed to terrorist actions or some other crime. Rather, the key
variables should be the type of information sought and the
8 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053, 1081-82 (1998); Christopher
Slobogin, The World Without A Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 68-75
(1991).
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type of transaction surveillance (target-based or event-based)
that is at issue. I propose recognizing three types of distinc-
tions based on the type of records sought: (1) the content of
personal records would be entitled to more protection than the
content of organizational records; (2) the content of personal
records held by private entities would be entitled to more pro-
tection than the content of personal records held by public
entities for public consumption; and (3) the content of records,
regardless of their subject or who holds them, would presump-
tively be entitled to more protection than records memorializ-
ing what I call "catalogic data" (information that simply iden-
tifies the nature of a communication or links a person to an
activity). With catalogic data, however, the second variable
mentioned above-the government's motivation in carrying out
the surveillance-is also important. If the information is sought
in connection with target-based, as opposed to event-based,
surveillance it should receive heightened protection.
More specifically, I propose that government should have
to obtain: (1) a warrant based on probable cause when it seeks
the content of personal records, or seeks catalogic data in
connection with target-based surveillance; (2) a Terry order
based on reasonable suspicion when it seeks the content of
records that are "public" in nature; (3) a traditional subpoena
based on relevance-or when there is concern about tipping off
a suspect, a delayed-notice subpoena based on relevanceg°-to
access the content of organizational records and to access
catalogic data in connection with event-based transaction
surveillance. Ex parte subpoenas, certification orders and
extrajudicial certifications should never be sufficient authority
to carry out nonconsensual searches and seizures for personal
90 Orin Kerr notes that, given the ease with which subpoena-service delays
can be obtained, the government can use subpoenas "without meaningful notice."
Orin S. Kerr, Symposium, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and
a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1234 (2004).
He also argues that the ninety-day delay period "serves no legitimate purpose,"
and instead proposes a thirty-day delay, permitted only upon judicial authoriza-
tion, with (rare) further extensions only after further judicial review. Id. at 1235.
This regime seems sensible.
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transaction information, except in emergencies, and then only
if quickly subject to judicial review. The following chart repre-
sents my proposal:
PROPOSED LAW OF TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE
Transaction Auth'zation Req'd Certainty Level
Content of privately- Warrant Probable Cause
held personal records
Content of publicly- Terry Order Reasonable Suspicion
held personal records
Content of organiza- Subpoena Relevance
tional records
Catalogic Data




Under this scheme, again, the contents of "personal" re-
cords are distinguished from the contents of "impersonal,"
organizational records, with acquisition of the former requir-
ing something more than mere relevance. Within the "person-
al" record category, "privately-held" records are distinguished
from "publicly-held" records, with acquisition of the former
requiring probable cause and of the latter reasonable suspi-
cion. Finally, "content" is distinguished from "catalogic data"
that simply describes the nature of a transaction, with the
authorization level for the latter dependent on whether it is
sought in connection with event-based surveillance of the type
involved in data mining and profiling, where only relevance is
required, or target-based surveillance which requires probable
cause. The reasoning behind these proposals, and definitions
of the key terms, follow, beginning with the all-important
distinction between organizational and personal transactions.
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A. Organizational v. Personal Content
In a previous article, Subpoenas and Privacy, I canvassed
several possible justifications for the current relaxed state of
transaction surveillance regulation."1 Although I discussed
six such justifications, they all fit within one of two categories:
they either minimize privacy concerns associated with transac-
tional information or rest on an assertion that law enforce-
ment could not function if transaction surveillance were sub-
ject to significant regulation. I also concluded that these ratio-
nales are not unpersuasive in the context in which subpoenas
first flourished-government efforts to obtain documentary
evidence of crimes committed by or within a business or other
regulated organization. As the Supreme Court has recognized
on numerous occasions, records of businesses and similar
entities are associated with a minimal degree of privacy, given
their impersonal nature and the high degree of state regula-
tion to which organizations are subject.2 The Court has also
pointed out in several cases that investigation of economic
crimes and regulatory violations would be extremely difficult
without ready access to documents detailing business activi-
ty.9 But my previous analysis also concluded that neither
the diminished-privacy rationale or the heightened-need justi-
fication applies when the records sought are personal.
The diminished-privacy rationale, as applied to personal
Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 805
(2005).
92 In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), the leading Supreme Court case on
grand jury document subpoenas, the Court stated that while a corporation "is a
creature of the state . . . [it] is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of
the public land] "receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter," while an indi-
vidual "owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, be-
yond the protection of his life and property." Id. at 74. In United States v. Mor-
ton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), one of the Court' leading administrative sub-
poena cases, it was even more forthright: "[Clorporations can claim no equality
with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy." Id. at 652.
" See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944) ("The scope and
nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations
and their representatives demand that the constitutional power of the federal and
state governments to regulate those activities be correspondingly effective.").
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records, is both descriptively and normatively flawed. When
such records are retained by the individual, they are thought
to be, and ought to be, as private as anything else in one's
home. Even when maintained by a third party, records about
an individual are, and should be, considered similarly private
if, as is usually the case, the transfer or collection of the infor-
mation occurred because the third party requires it in order to
carry out an important societal service. Hospitals, banks,
Internet service providers and public agencies usually only
have personal data because we must provide it (or allow it to
be accumulated) in order to receive the services these entities
provide. Stated another way, most third party record-holders
possess information about us because we cannot otherwise
realistically function in the modern world. Thus, contrary to
the Supreme Court's assertion in Miller, the surrender of per-
sonal information to these third parties is hardly "voluntary."
Nor does it, or should it, lead us to "assume" that the third
party will function as an institutional undercover agent, a
conduit for any information the government wants.94
The argument that more rigorous regulation of transac-
tion surveillance would unduly hinder the government's law
enforcement efforts is also weak when applied to personal
records. There is no doubt that requiring probable cause to
obtain records will make investigation of crime more difficult.
But to convert that fact into a rationale for removing restric-
tions on government evidence-gathering makes a mockery of
constitutional protections, for the warrant and probable cause
requirements always have that effect. In this context as well,
" Empirical research confirms that most people view a search of records con-
taining their personal information to be at least as intrusive as a search of a car
or luggage. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expecta-
tions of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DuKE L.J. 727, 738-
39 (1993) (Table 1) (finding that a sample of 217 individuals, on average, ranked
"perusing bank records" as more "intrusive" than searches of the trunk of a car
and a footlocker in a car); see also Lior Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of
Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005) (arguing that, under social networks theo-
ry, information revealed to small social groups should generally be considered
private unless the target's actions or status removes it from obscurity).
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a viable distinction exists between investigations of organiza-
tional activity and investigation of street crime and the like.
Evidence of organizational crime, particularly of the economic
variety, is largely if not entirely documentary; indeed, without
such evidence even the victims of such crime may not realize
it has occurred. But the same is seldom true of other types of
crime. Whereas "it is a fact of life that agencies charged with
regulating economic activity often cannot articulate probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion that a violation has tran-
spired without first examining documents reflecting a party's
economic activity," 5 police engaged in investigating other
types of criminal activity usually can develop some non-docu-
mentary lead, whether it is from the victim, a third party
eyewitness, or physical surveillance of public movements. 6
If one accepts these arguments, then it is important to
separate personal from organizational documents. Fortunately,
as I explained in Subpoenas and Privacy,7 the Supreme
Court has already done much work in this regard, in the
course of defining the concept of a "collective" entity and the
notion of "required records" for purposes of determining when
there is a Fifth Amendment right to resist documentary sub-
poenas. Although the Court's reconceptualization of the Fifth
Amendment in the mid-1970s has rendered these cases largely
irrelevant for Fifth Amendment purposes,98 they are directly
" Parks v. FDIC, 65 F.3d 207, *11 (1st Cir. 1995), withdrawn 64 USLW 2166
(Selya, J., dissenting).
9' SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., 1 GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE 6-3 (2d ed. 2002)
("Ordinarily, investigations of so-called 'street crimes' such as murder, rape, rob-
bery, and assault, can be conducted effectively without resort to the subpoena
power."); KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF AT-
TORNEYS AT WORK 233-34 (1985) (noting that the easiest crimes to hide are those
where the victim does not realize he or she has been victimized, those where the
location of the crime is "not apparent"-making witnesses hard to identify-and
those where the "inculpatory information is embedded in normal social life," all
factors much more likely to be associated with organizational rather than individ-
ual crime).
" Slobogin, supra note 91.
" The crucial decision was Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976),
which decisively moved the Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence from a focus
on privacy to a focus on coercion. There the Court held that because a document
[Vol. 75
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pertinent to the current task of identifying which types of
records are associated with minimal privacy. That is because
these cases explicitly tried to demarcate when records are
entitled to what the Court eventually called "a zone of priva-
cy."99 In essence, in its collective entity cases the Court con-
cluded that the records of any organization that has an identi-
ty separate from its individual members lie outside that
zone.00 In its required records cases, the Court similarly
held that the government may force individuals to keep and
disclose documents that are crucial for regulating their activi-
ties and "have assumed 'public aspects' which render [the
records] at least analogous to public documents."10' Consis-
tent with these two lines of cases, records that pertain to a
collective entity or that fit the required-records criteria ought
to be accessible on mere issuance of a subpoena.
Other records, however, should receive more protection.
The Fourth Amendment specifically speaks of searches of
papers, as well as searches of persons, houses, and effects, and
it usually requires probable cause for these searches. Accord-
ingly, subpoenas demanding the contents of personal records
should generally be invalid under the Fourth Amendment
unless they are based on such a showing. The rest of this
section discusses whether there should be any other excep-
tions to this rule outside of the organizational investigation
setting.
subpoena does not compel the creation of documents, it only implicates the Fifth
Amendment when the act of production it compels provides the prosecution with
useful incriminating information. See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463
(1976) (holding that a search warrant compels neither the creation or production
of documents).
'9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
100 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92, 94-95 (1974) (holding that
even though a small law firm "embodies little more than the personal legal prac-
tice of the individual partners," it is a "formal institutional arrangement orga-
nized for the continuing conduct of the firm's legal practice," and thus was "an
independent entity apart from its individual members").
101 See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968) (describing the com-
ponents of the required records doctrine established in Shapiro u. United States,
335 U.S. 1 (1948)).
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B. Private v. Public Records
One distinction regarding personal records that could be
made is between those records that are "private" and those
that are in the public domain. As the required-records line of
cases suggests, when the records fit in the latter category, the
privacy associated with their content is considerably dimin-
ished. With truly public records, the information can no longer
be said to be "owned" solely by the individual and the record-
holder. In that instance, reasonable suspicion-the justification
level that falls between probable cause and relevance-ought to
be sufficient justification for permitting government access.
Public records and records held by a public entity are not
synonymous however. The word "public" can apply to function-
ally "private" institutions such as hospitals, schools and librar-
ies, as well as to courthouses and government agencies. And
even government agencies can house records that are more
personal than public. 102
How can we determine when public records are not really
public and therefore deserving of full Fourth Amendment
protection? Once again, statutory law and litigation in other
contexts have already ploughed this ground. In particular,
provisions in the federal Freedom of Information Act and simi-
lar state statutes are directly on point. While these laws es-
tablish a presumption in favor of disclosure of records held by
government agencies, primarily as a means of increasing gov-
ernment transparency and facilitating social transactions such
as business deals,l °3 they usually exempt from disclosure a
wide array of "personal" records. Thus, under the federal stat-
ute, government agencies must resist a FOIA request for
"commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential, " °4 "personnel and medical
'0' See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 127 (2002) (describing "a system where the government
extracts personal information from the populace and places it in the public do-
main").
101 Id. at 140.
5 U.S.C. 552(bX4). Many circuits have held that voluntarily submitted infor-
[Vol. 75
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files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,"0 5 and
law enforcement records to the extent they include informa-
tion that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy."16 State FOIA stat-
utes or interpretive caselaw protect various other types of
records. For instance, Florida, which is known as the Sun-
shine State not only because of its weather but also because of
the breadth of its public records disclosure law, nonetheless
exempts from unrestricted disclosure some types of motor
vehicle registration information,0 7 identifying information
relating to health care provided by the state,"8 credit infor-
mation held by state agencies,0 9  and educational
records. °10 In many states, some types of licensing informa-
tion are also exempt from disclosure."'
mation will be deemed "confidential" for the purpose of this exemption if it is of
a kind that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from
whom it has obtained records. See, e.g., Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984
(1992). See generally What Constitutes "Trade Secrets and Commercial or Finan-
cial Information Obtained from Person and Privileged or Confidential," Exempt
from Disclosure under Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4)) (FO1A),
139 A.L.R. FED. 225 (2004).
15 Id. § 552(bX6). The Supreme Court has defined "similar files" broadly, to
include "detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as
applying to that individual," U.S. Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S.
595, 602 (1982), although it has also made clear that such files cannot be with-
held simply because such identification cannot be guaranteed, and that redaction
of identifying names may be sufficient. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 381-82 (1976). See generally Annotation, When Are Government Records "Sim-
ilar Files" Exempt from Disclosure under Freedom of Information Act Provision (5
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6)) Exempting, Certain Personnel, Medical, and "Similar" Files,
106 A.L.R. FED. 94 (2004).
'06 Id. at 552(bX7)(c). Thus, for instance, a person's rap sheet may be exempt
from disclosure. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989). See generally James 0. Pearson, Annotation,
What Constitutes "Unwarranted Invasion of Personal Privacy" for Purposes of Law
Enforcement Investigatory Records Exemption of Freedom of Information Act (5
U.S.C.A. sec. 552(b)(7)(C)), 52 A.L.R. FED. 181 (2004).
10" FLA. STAT. § 119.07(aa).
10 Id. at (bb), (cc), & (hh).
o Id. at (dd).
110 FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(d).
III See, e.g., Mager v. State Dep't of Police, 595 N.W.2d 142, 143 (1999) (hold-
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When federal or state law indicates that information
found in government records should be withheld despite the
strong interest in freedom of information, it ought to be con-
sidered private for Fourth Amendment purposes as well. That
should mean that law enforcement must demonstrate probable
cause to obtain it. For other records held by public entities,
reasonable suspicion is sufficient.
Recall, however, that even this latter level of justification
demands more than the current legal regime, which usually
does not even require a subpoena in such situations, but rath-
er permits law enforcement access to public records with a
simple extrajudicial certification. A curious law enforcement
officer should not be able to sift through the personal data
found in divorce papers, real estate documents and court pro-
ceedings without articulating a specific need for it. That artic-
ulation should take place beforehand to a judge or, in the
manner typical of a subpoena, after notification and chal-
lenge.'
A common complaint about such an approach is that it
places more limits on government officials than on members of
the public, who can access public records at will and, with the
advent of Google and other Internet search services, can do so
more easily than ever before. But most of the time the public
only seeks public information when it has a specific need for it
(akin to the reasonable suspicion standard).'13 More impor-
tantly, government's resources and power are so much more
significant, and its hunger for information so much more vora-
cious, especially post-9/11, that its potential for abusing per-
ing that "gun ownership is information of a personal nature." requiring exemption
from the state freedom of information act); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 656.702(1)
("[t]he records of the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation, excepting em-
ployer account records and claimant files, shall be open to public inspection.")
(emphasis added).
11' Note that this procedure is no more onerous, from the law officer's per-
spective, than the current pen register regime. See supra notes 43-47 and accom-
panying text.
1.3 Noah Rothbaum, Spies Like Us, SMART MONEY (Feb. 2005) at 89-92 (de-
scribing the various ways people might and do use new search engines, including
investigating job applicants and real estate for sale).
[Vol. 75
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sonal information far exceeds anything individuals or even
corporations might do." 4
C. Catalogic Data
By "catalogic data" I mean information that classifies and
describes a transaction, as distinguished from the content of
the transaction. Catalogic data includes descriptors of commu-
nications and transmissions, such as phone numbers dialed,
the addresses that route emails, and the duration of phone
calls and Internet session times. This category of transactional
information also includes membership lists; plane, train and
ship passenger manifests; business records listing who pur-
chased what and when; and other archives that describe the
identities of those who have participated in a particular activi-
ty or communication.
This listing overlaps with some of the information that
ECPA permits the government to obtain with an ex parte
subpoena or a certification order. However, I would not in-
clude within the rubric of catalogic data other types of person-
al information ECPA currently allows government to obtain
with an ex parte subpoena, such as the URLs of websites
visited or the identity of those using pseudonyms." 5 This
kind of information is more akin to content: the URLs can be
used to visit the same websites the target visits, and disclo-
sure of the person behind the pseudonym will often allow
government to link that person to particular messages.116
So limited, catalogic data should not be entitled to as
... See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (describing concerns about
government's ability to obtain and abuse information); see also SoLOvE, supra
note 102, at 168-75 (describing current government efforts to obtain information
about millions of citizens and concluding that "we are already closer to Total
Information Awareness than we might think") & 175-87 (describing possible abus-
es of information-gathering, including "creeping totalitarianism," inhibition of free-
dom of association, and J. Edgar Hoover's misuse of surveillance against alleged
communist party members and people like Martin Luther King).
11s See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
... See generally John Alan Farmer, Note, The Specter of Crypto-Anarchy: Reg-
ulating Anonymity--Protecting Peer-to-Peer Networks, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 725
(2003).
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much protection as the content of communications, because it
is not as personal as the substance of communications made
during the transaction. That is not to say, as the Supreme
Court has said, that the Fourth Amendment is irrelevant
when something other than content is at issue. Smith v. Mary-
land notwithstanding, 1 7 most of us would not expect the
people who work at our phone company (or Internet service
provider) to care who we call (or write to), an expectation that
is undoubtedly correct." ' But the evidence that catalogic da-
ta provides about content is, at best, circumstantial. Catalogic
data is to the substance of the contact as the visage is to per-
sonality. Thus, while it is entitled to some protection, catalogic
data should not be treated in the same way the associated
content is.
The analysis changes, however, when the government
uses technologically-enhanced transaction surveillance to
aggregate catalogic data. When information from pen registers,
snoopware programs, and commercial data broker programs is
combined, it can identify all of our surreptitious connections
with the world, providing powerful evidence of our activities
and beliefs." 's To use the words of the commentator quoted
earlier, law enforcement can construct a "complete mosaic of a
person's characteristics" through this type of transaction sur-
veillance. Under these circumstances, the information the
government accumulates is more akin to content than mere
cataloguing. The visage analogy no longer applies.
This distinction between aggregated and isolated catalogic
data roughly maps onto the distinction between target-based
and event-based transaction surveillance described earlier.
... See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
II' Cf Wayne LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principis in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 302 (1986) (bank officials do not
have "direct, significant contact with the underlying transactional information" in
the same way law enforcement officers who collect all of an individual's financial
information would) (quoting Note, 83 YALE L.J. 1439, 1463-64 (1974)).
19 See generally Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
393, 398 (2002) ("What we buy is how we present ourselves to the outside world;
it represents how we choose to interact with it . . . . These preferences are ex-
pressive, revealing and private.").
[Vol. 75
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When government has identified a target, it will tend to accu-
mulate as much information as possible about the target.
Under such circumstances, the transaction surveillance will
produce a personality "mosaic" that is deserving of maximum
protection.
Event-based transaction surveillance of catalogic data is
usually different. Recall the example given earlier of the snip-
er investigation in which police find a sweater thread and
footprint they believe belong to the sniper, and also know that
the sniper reads a particular type of detective novel. Law
enforcement attempts to identify the sniper through accessing
the records of local clothing, shoe and bookstores are likely to
disclose the names of numerous innocent people who have
purchased items similar to those thought to be owned by the
criminal. But this information, while personal, is merely a
piece of the mosaic, not nearly the complete picture that tar-
get-based surveillance is likely to produce. In this situation, a
relevance showing should be enough, at least when the access
does not infringe First Amendment interests.
120
However, ex parte subpoenas, certification orders and
extrajudicial certifications, which are the current means of
regulating access to catalogic data when there is any regula-
tion at all, are insufficiently restrictive despite their reliance
on the relevance standard. These devices leave the transaction
surveillance decision about personal data entirely or almost
entirely in the discretion of law enforcement even when no
exigent circumstances exist, a notion that is antithetical to the
Fourth Amendment. 121 Instead, in non-emergency situations
1'2 The Supreme Court has indicated that requiring an individual engaged in
advocacy to surrender anonymity without good cause can infringe First Amend-
ment interests. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958) ("It is hardly a novel perception that 'compelled disclosure of affiliation
with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective . . . restraint on
freedom of association."'); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (prohibiting
compelling teachers to disclose group memberships).
121 As Justice Jackson stated in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
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the government should be able to obtain catalogic data in
connection with event-based surveillance only when a judge
finds it is relevant to an investigation, an assertion the record-
holder should have the opportunity to challenge unless notifi-
cation would undermine the investigation.
D. Data Mining/Profile Information
Data mining is event-based transaction surveillance-the
use of records searches to discern patterns of behavior that
can be linked to past or future crime, without having a specific
individual or individuals in mind. Several formal data mining
programs exist. For instance, the Homeland Security Depart-
ment runs something called the Electronic Surveillance Sys-
tem for Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics
(ESSENCE), which gathers personally identifiable information
from emergency rooms, health plans, clinical laboratories, 911
calls, pharmacies, and veterinary clinics in an effort to discern
unusual or suspicious symptoms and events.122 The En-
hanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
requires aircrafts and sea vessels to submit departure and
arrival manifests indicating the names of all alien passengers,
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protec-
tion consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Govern-
ment enforcement agent ....
Jackson then went on to list the "exceptional circumstances in which, on bal-
ancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may
be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with: when
a "suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight"; "[tihe search was of ... a movable
vehicle"; or "evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction."
Id. at 15.
"' See Katherine McIntire Peters, Pattern Recognition, Sept. 19, 2003,
available at http://www.govexec.conmfeatures/0903/0903s2.htm (describing ES-
SENCE). ESSENCE is a much reduced version of the maligned Total Information
Awareness program, now labeled Terrorism Information Program, that was re-
stricted by Congress in 2002. 10 U.S.C. § 2241 (limiting scope and appropriations
for total information awareness program).
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which can be combed for suspicious travel patterns. 123 The
much more sophisticated Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS) purportedly combines airline
passenger lists with travel reservations, rental car status,
travel companions, and address. 124 Data mining comes in
many forms, but all varieties have one thing in common: they
rely on dragnet perusal of transaction information.
One way of analyzing the Fourth Amendment implica-
tions of data mining would be to focus on the nature of the
records that are mined. Under this approach, if ESSENCE ac-
cesses the contents of personally identified medical records for
criminal investigation purposes, its algorithm ought to identify
only people who are highly likely to be perpetrators of crime,
while if all of its information comes from "public" records or is
composed of isolated catalogic sources, then its ability to iden-
tify criminals need not be as potent. A second way of analyz-
ing data mining would be to look at the extent to which it
aggregates information about the individuals it investigates
and tags. If one accepts the concern about creation of "per-
sonality mosaics" described earlier, data mining would need a
high hit rate to the extent it accumulates a significant amount
of identifiable data about individuals, even if, as with CAPPS,
all of the information is catalogic in nature.
Either way, data mining does not fare well. From what we
know, the profiles used in the programs are very unlikely to
identify even a small number of terrorists or other criminals.
In other words, they may not even be successful enough to
pass the relevance test (which requires that the investigative
technique do better than chance), much less reach a level of
success commensurate with reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. Perhaps if such a data mining program relied only on a
small amount of catalogic data to identify potential targets, it
123 8 U.S.C. §1731(aX2) (requiring the establishment of a database for all arriv-
als and departures).
12 See Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights
Remedies to Post-9111 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 AsIAN L.J. 215,
221 (2003) (describing a profile using roughly 40 items which, although secret, are
likely to include those listed).
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 75 Miss. L.J. 181 2005-2006
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
would be permissible under the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment put forward here.12 But once government be-
gins using multiple databases to put together detailed dossiers
on the activities of its citizens, it would have to show more
than just a possibility that something useful might turn up.
IV. COUNTER-PROPOSALS
What does this set of proposals mean for our detective
friend, described in Part I of this article? If he is investigating
a particular person (the frequent flyer, the free-spender or the
young Arab man), he needs a Terry order to access public
records through Choicepoint or one of the other commercial
data brokers. And he needs a warrant based on probable cause
to access the contents of the suspect's financial, school, medi-
cal and similar personal records, as well as to obtain aggregat-
ed catalogic information such as addresses of the person's
email messages. If instead he is engaging in event-based in-
vestigation, the nature of the records sought determines the
justification needed. If, as in the hypotheticals described in
Part I, the focus is store records (in an effort to track down a
sniper-killer), or skydiving club membership lists and cookies
of websites (in an effort to identify terrorists planning to bomb
a mall), he would be on solid ground if this catalogic data is
likely to increase the probability of identifying the perpetra-
tors. If instead access is sought to the content of personal
records or to catalogic data that implicates First Amendment
interests, individualized suspicion would be required.'26
"' A recently released report by a Department of Defense advisory committee
requires court approval of data mining that will obtain "personally identifiable
information" from records not readily available to the public. See Report of the
Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight
Against Terrorism 49, 51 (March 2004). However, it requires the court to find
only that the information obtained be "reasonably related" to the investigation
purpose-a relevance standard?-and does not otherwise distinguish between types
of records. Id. at 51-52. The report makes several good suggestions regarding
"anonymizing" data, record-keeping and other means of monitoring data mining.
Id. at 48-59.
16 The analysis should not change if government seeks personal information
from records acquired by a commercial data broker that has obtained the infor-
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While this set of rules is not uncomplicated, it recognizes
fewer types of authorizations than the current regime. The
officer need merely make distinctions between personal and
public records when conducting target-based transaction sur-
veillance, and between content and catalogic data when con-
ducting event-base surveillance. Moreover, since transaction
surveillance should generally only proceed pursuant to court
order, any confusion on the detective's part can be cleared up
by a judge.
One can imagine numerous alternative methods of regu-
lating transaction surveillance. Professor Daniel Solove has
put forth the most coherent alternative to current law and the
proposal presented here. 2 ' He points out that technology has
made it easier both to maintain information about people and
to aggregate it. 12 Thus, he proposes that, rather than at-
tempt to figure out a privacy hierarchy and match authoriza-
tion requirements to it (the proportionality approach that
informs this article), we should adopt a uniform regulatory
regime for government access to any "system of records."'29
Specifically, Solove proposes that, outside of emergency situa-
tions, government should not be able to obtain information in
records-whether it is content or catalogic data, whether it is
held by private or public agencies-unless it can obtain what
he calls a "regulated subpoena."'3 ° To obtain such a subpoe-
na the government would have to demonstrate it has probable
cause to believe the person whose records are sought is in-
volved in criminal activity, and that the specific records tar-
geted are of "material importance" to the investigation, which
he describes as a standard that is "slightly more permissive
mation from the original record-holders. Otherwise, much of this regulation could
be avoided. Data does not become less personal simply because it has been shift-
ed from one entity to another. The crucial questions are whether it is content or
catalogicorganizational information, and whether it was originally collected for
private or public purposes.
..7 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).
"a Id. at 1090-95.
'2 Id. at 1152-59.
-3 Id. at 1164.
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than that of a warrant," though more demanding than the
relevance standard required for a subpoena (and, presumably,
the reasonable suspicion required for a Terry order).13' As
with traditional subpoenas, the regulated subpoena would be
challengeable by the target.'32
Solove makes interesting arguments as to why his ap-
proach is superior to a proportionality approach. First, he
points to the difficulty of differentiating between degrees of
privacy and intimacy,'33 a difficulty illustrated by my at-
tempts to distinguish content from catalogic information, per-
sonal from organizational records, and private from public
records. Second, even if we could resolve these definitional
problems, Solove believes that making privacy the linchpin of
analysis is conceptually bankrupt. He notes, for instance, that
we would never think of requiring the police to obtain a war-
rant in order to obtain a description of a suspect's genitals
from his sexual partner, yet that information is probably as
"private" as anything found in one's medical records."3 Pri-
vacy, Solove argues, is a contextual concept that cannot form
the basis for uniform regulation."l 5 Rather, in the transac-
tion surveillance setting, the focus should be whether the
information is maintained in a system of records. 3 ' So, to
return to his example, the police could interview the sexual
partner without restriction, but would need a regulated sub-
poena to access the medical record of the suspect for the same
information.
I agree with the premise of both of Solove's arguments,
but am less persuaded that they lead to his conclusion. Solove
'31 Id. at 1164-65.
132 Id. at 1165.
' Id. at 1152-53.
13 Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1153-54. Solove develops this point in much more detail in Daniel J.
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1088-99 (2002).
1" Solove, supra note 127, at 1157 ("Focusing on 'systems of records' targets
the type of information flow that raises concern. Because the problem of modern
government information-gathering is caused by the increasing dossiers maintained
in private sector record systems, the architecture targets those third parties that
store data in record systems.").
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is right that making the subtle distinctions demanded by a
proportionality approach is difficult and can result in over or
under protection of information at the margins. But requiring
a uniform standard of probable cause for all record searches,
as Solove would, provides far too much protection for some
types of information. For instance, data mining of any sort
would be almost impossible; if probable cause were required,
the sniper-killer and terrorist investigations described above
would probably never get off the ground. Or imagine that
police want to find out from the phone company who called a
murder victim in the two weeks prior to the murder (a scenar-
io often depicted on TV shows like Law & Order). While they
would certainly be able to demonstrate the relevance of this
catalogic data, they would not have probable cause with re-
spect to any of the callers, and thus would not be able to ob-
tain the regulated subpoena for the phone company's records
that Solove would demand. Creating a hierarchy of privacy, as
tricky as it is, is important as a means of enabling the balanc-
ing of government and individual interests that the Supreme
Court has sanctioned since the 1960s.' 37
I also agree that the extent to which we are willing to
protect private information is contextual, as Solove's example
of the sexual partner interview demonstrates. However, that
conclusion does not mean that privacy should be discarded as
the baseline consideration in determining the government's
authority to obtain information about its citizens. The reason
we should treat interviews differently from records requests is
not because privacy somehow is irrelevant in the former situa-
tion, but because the target's interest in privacy is countered
by an even stronger interest-the third party's autonomy. Hu-
man information sources, such as the sexual partner, should
have a right to decide what to do with the information they
possess; in such cases, the subject's privacy interest is out-
weighed by the source's autonomy interest.3 ' When the
13 See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) ("[Tlhere can be no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails.").
1" Mary Irene Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or The
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third party is an impersonal record-holder, on the other hand,
concerns about denigrating "personhood" through limitations
on when information may be revealed are non-existent. 139 It
is the absence of a legitimate third party interest in surren-
dering the target's private information, not the bare fact that
the information happens to reside in a record, that distin-
guishes the records request scenario from the interview set-
ting.
These considerations lead me to conclude, contrary to
Solove, that privacy concerns should be the fundamental con-
sideration in analyzing transaction surveillance. While infor-
mation generally should be accorded privacy protection when
recorded, the extent of that protection should depend on the
degree of privacy associated with the information, not simply
on whether it exists in record form. Thus, some transactional
information-i.e., that found in truly public records and
catalogic data-should be accessible on less than probable
cause.
Another alternative to the proportionality approach ad-
vanced here evades the issue of whether it is under or over
protective of privacy by asserting that it focuses on the wrong
sort of privacy invasion. Professor William Stuntz concedes
that "secret searches" of our transactional information create
risks that "are worth worrying about."4 ° But he contends
that we would not be particularly bothered by easy govern-
ment access to such information if we never find out it has
occurred except in connection with prosecutions for serious
Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1643-44 (1987).
'"' For further development of this point, see Slobogin, supra note 89, at 834-
35. Of course, the employees of the record-holder might want to reveal private
information. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attrib-
utes After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 1013 (1996) ("As the
president of the United States Telephone Association put it in explaining that
telephone companies are interested in acceding to law enforcement requests for
assistance, the companies want to be 'good local citizen[s].). But limiting that
ability is not denying the employee's "personhood," because the information is
maintained by the institution, not the person.
140 William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2181
(2002).
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crime.' In other words, covert access to and stringent con-
trol over use of transaction information should permit relax-
ation of the rules as to how we obtain it.
This ignorance-is-bliss notion is superficially attractive.
But limiting information flow, which is essential to Stuntz'
scheme, can be very difficult. The notion that data gathered by
law enforcement will be restricted to a small group of govern-
ment employees is particularly naive in the wake of 9/11,
when literally hundreds of thousands of law enforcement offi-
cers are charged with fighting "terrorism," an amorphous
threat to say the least."" And ensuring that the information
government officials acquire through covert surveillance is
used only for the purpose of prosecuting serious crime could be
equally difficult, precisely because the surveillance is co-
vert.43 Finally, abandoning all suspicion requirements, as
Stuntz would do, virtually guarantees that data would be
gathered about large numbers of innocent people, which in
turn is likely to increase the chances of government files con-
taining misleading information about its citizens.""
Even if the information gathered is somehow confined to a
limited and discrete group and is not misused or inaccurate in
any way, routine suspicionless and covert transaction surveil-
lance can eat away at whatever trust is left between govern-
ment and its citizenry. As I wrote in a discussion of Stuntz'
proposal in the context of public camera surveillance:
141 Id. at 2184-85.
" See generally, Gabriel Soll, Terrorism: The Known Element No One Can
Define, 11 WILLAMETrE J. INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 123 (2004). See also Peter
Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1306, 1371 (2004) (stating that "the history of previous cycles shows the
temptation of surveillance systems to justify an ever-increasing scope of activity,
in the hopes that just a little bit more surveillance will catch the terrorists or
prevent an attack").
143 Id. at 1366 (discussing "a long-run concern that secret . . . orders" allowing
"access to entire databases of records . . . will be used expansively to intrude into
a wide array of domestic matters").
'" The recent exemption of the FBI's Central Records System database from
the provision in the Privacy Act that requires government records to be accurate,
68 Fed. Reg. 14140 (Mar. 24, 2003) (to be codified as 28 C.F.R. pt. 16), will not
help matters.
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once the public becomes aware that random covert surveil-
lance is occurring, as it inevitably would after a few prosecu-
tions in which the covertly gleaned information is used, the
panoptic effect of this regime will be greater than occurs with
overt [surveillance] .... [We would assume that secret sur-
veillance was pervasive, not just incidental .... Probably no
passage in Orwell's novel 1984 is more chilling than the [fol-
lowing]: "there was of course no way of knowing whether you
were being watched at any given moment. . . It was even
conceivable that they watched everybody all the time.""5
With the power of today's computers, government could moni-
tor the transactions of everybody, all the time. A regulatory
regime that explicitly endorsed that sort of process would de-
stroy any sense of security people might have in today's techno-
logical society. Indeed, if government is to be allowed to find
out details of our lives whenever it is interested in doing so, we
would probably be more comfortable knowing precisely when
the surveillance is occurring, rather than being left in the
dark.4
6
A final means of regulating transaction surveillance is to
leave the task up to the legislature, specifically Congress. Pro-
fessor Orin Kerr has made the most powerful argument for this
approach.4 7 He correctly points out that congressional stat-
utes have provided more protection against transaction surveil-
lance than the Supreme Court's construal of the Fourth
Amendment in cases like Miller,4 4 and that, in theory, legis-
latures are better equipped than courts to craft clear rules
"' Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 305 (2002); see also The Council
for Excellence in Government, From the Home Front to the Front Lines, America
Speaks Out About Homeland Security 6 (March 2004) available at http://www.
excelgov.org (poll indicating that 72% of Americans have "some" or "very little"
trust in the government to "use personal information appropriately").
4 Cf DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998) (arguing that "watching
the watchers" is the only workable method of regulating government intrusion in
the age of technology).
'47 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the New Technologies: Constitu-
tional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004).
"' Id. at 856.
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governing transaction surveillance in an era of rapidly chang-
ing, complicated technology.149 But his arguments fail to ne-
gate two crucial facts, documented in this article, about the
transaction surveillance rules that Congress has enacted to
date: The rules have not been particularly clear 5 ' and, more
importantly, they do not provide adequate protection against
government access to our personal records. Especially in the
wake of 9/11, Congress is unlikely to alter its stance unless the
courts, relying on the Fourth Amendment, nudge it in the right
direction.
Will the courts be willing to engage in such nudging? Cer-
tainly, Miller, Smith and like cases indicate that the Supreme
Court is reticent about doing so. But in more recent decisions
applying the "special needs" doctrine, which raises parallel
issues, the Court has backed off its nonchalant attitude toward
nontraditional searches and seizures. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, ' the Court declared unconstitutional a policy
that authorized hospital drug testing of pregnant patients for
the purpose of detecting illegal drug use, over a dissent by
Justice Scalia arguing that, under Miller, the patients volun-
tarily assumed the risk the results of such tests would be used
for investigative purposes.'52 The majority in Ferguson ig-
nored Scalia's complaint, reasoning that a reasonable patient
would assume the test results would be used for diagnostic
purposes and that otherwise they would be kept confiden-
tial."3 In both Ferguson and Indianapolis v. Edmond,'54
',' Id. at 857-87.
's Kerr himself has noted that much of the legislation governing transaction
surveillance is complicated. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 90, at 1208 ("[Clourts,
legislators, and even legal scholars have had a very hard time making sense of
the [Stored Communications Act of ECPAJ."); Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of
Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime
Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820 (2003) (the "law of electronic surveillance is fa-
mously complex, if not entirely impenetrable.").
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
1 Id. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Until today, we have never held--or even
suggested-that material which a person voluntarily entrusts to someone else
cannot be given by that person to the police, and used for whatever evidence it
may contain.").
15 Id. at 78 ("The use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibili-
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which held invalid a roadblock set up to interdict narcotics, the
Court also emphasized that individualized cause requirements
may not be relaxed if the only "special need" pleaded by the
government is a "general interest in law enforcement.""'5
Ferguson signals that the Court is hesitant about granting
the government an exemption from traditional Fourth Amend-
ment standards simply because information relevant to a crimi-
nal investigation has been handed over to a third party (thus
undermining Miller's premise). And both Ferguson and
Edmond suggest that strong government allegations that relax-
ation of those standards is necessary to detect criminal activity
will not always prevail (thus undermining the "heightened
need" rationale as a ground for reducing Fourth Amendment
protections). These decisions provide a glimmer of hope that,
when confronted with cases challenging subpoenas for personal
records about medical treatment, personal finances and the
contents of email messages, the Court will withdraw from its
broad pronouncements in Miller. If it does so, further, more
detailed rule-making along the lines suggested here might best
be left to Congress, for the reasons Kerr suggests. The goal is
meaningful protection of personal information. The source of
that protection is not so important.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of government surveillance has tended to focus on
communications and physical surveillance. Yet transaction
surveillance is at least as pervasive as these other types of
ty for a particular benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate
in an extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy than
the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties. The reasonable
expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests
in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical
personnel without her consent.").
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
155 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 ("When law enforcement
authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints such as
here, however, stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized sus-
picion.").
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investigative techniques, and can be as inimical to privacy
interests. Public and private records contain information re-
garding virtually every aspect of our lives. In the past few
decades, technology has made that information infinitely more
easily aggregated and accessible.
Nonetheless, neither legislatures nor courts have evidenced
much concern about transaction surveillance. Congress appears
to think of transaction information as "business records," and
thus at most entitled to the protection afforded by subpoenas,
while the Supreme Court tells us we must assume the risk that
record-holders will betray us. These positions ignore the obvi-
ous fact that medical, financial and other types of private and
public records contain much personal information. They also
fail to acknowledge that disclosure of that information to re-
cord-keepers--disclosure that those of us who live a modern
lifestyle cannot avoid-is no different, in expectation of privacy
terms, than communicating with others by phone or email or
interacting with others inside one's home, both activities clear-
ly protected by the Constitution. As Senator Sam Ervin recog-
nized in 1974, "[glovernment has an insatiable appetite for
power, and it will not stop usurping power unless it is re-
strained by laws they cannot repeal or nullify." ' 6 When it
comes to transaction surveillance, only the Fourth Amendment
provides that type of restraint.
" Introductory Remarks of Senator Sam J. Ervin on S. 3418, H.R. REP. No.
93-1416 (1974), reprinted in U.S. CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974, at 3-8 (1976).
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